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Abstract: Clegg, Flyvbjerg and Haugaard debate the strengths and weaknesses of a 
Foucauldian-Nietzschean critique of power compared to a tradition exemplified by 
Lukes and Habermas. Flyvbjerg and Clegg argue that the pursuit of universal 
normative principles and of rationality without power may lead to oppressive utopian 
thinking. Drawing on the Aristotelian tradition of phronesis they propose a 
contextualist form of critique that situates itself in analysis of local practices to render 
domination transparent and open to change. While Haugaard accepts there cannot be a 
universal view that transcends the particularities of context, he argues that the 
phronetic approach is crypto-normative because it implicitly presupposes 
unacknowledged liberal normative premises; moreover, any use of ‘truth’ as a criterion 
follows Enlightenment principles of verification.	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Mark Haugaard: By way of beginning this exchange it might be useful to situate 
Bent’s phronetic approach relative to the wider context of the power debates. In 
particular, the opposition between Lukesian and Foucauldian approaches, which I will 
use as ideal type representations of the contrast between modern and post-modern 
methods. This will be followed by an analysis of the concept of tension points, which 
are key to phronesis. 
As observed by Stewart (Clegg and Pitsis 2012), when Lukes wrote Power: a 
radical view he wanted to highlight the way in which the dominated appear to 
acquiesce in their own domination, which is also a phenomenon that fascinates 
Foucault. Lukes theorized this acquiescence as the third dimension of power, where 
actors are not simply dominated through overt decision-making and nondecision-
making (the first and second dimensions of power) but through the determination of 
their thoughts, wants and desires. (Lukes 1974: 23). Unfortunately, Lukes theorized 
this with reference to the Marxist conceptualization of ‘false consciousness’ and ‘real 
interests’, which carries significant controversial baggage. These terms suggest that the 
observing social scientist possesses true consciousness and knows social actors’ 
interests better then they do themselves. As later acknowledged by Lukes (2005: 144-
6), this implied an unacceptable privileging of the knowledge of the social scientist, 
with elitist and even totalitarian implications (Leninism). However, more profoundly, 
to methodologically bracket these concerns, Lukes was essentially arguing that power 
and truth exist in an inverse relationship, whereby domination is reproduced through 
the obscuring of truth. This constitutes a classic enlightenment claim to the effect that 
domination comes from, often self-incurred, tutelage to dogmatic authority. A position 
in line with Kant’s famous injunction in the opening of his short essay, ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’:  
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Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s 
inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-
incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in the lack of reason but in the lack of 
resolution and courage to use it without direction of another. Sapere aude! ‘Have 
courage to use your reason!’ – that is the motto of the enlightenment. Kant ([1784] 
2007). 
In Lukes, the person subject to the third dimension of power does not know their 
real interests or wants, not because of failure of courage, as in Kant, but because they 
have been prevented from the correct use of reason through relations of domination. 
They do not see the truth of their situation as a consequence of power. Hence, truth and 
reason become a potential banner that can be raised against domination. 
From the 1980s onwards (a few years after the 1974 (first edition) publication of 
Power: a radical view) the Anglophone academic world of power research became 
hugely influenced by Foucault’s accounts of the mutually constitutive relationship 
between power and knowledge, (Power/Knowledge (1980)). Foucault’s analysis 
renders the Lukesian ‘false consciousness’ account of domination particularly 
problematic as the implicitly postulated position of the social scientist as dispenser of 
true knowledge and real interests appears to be premised upon the very foundations of 
the strategies of domination identified by Foucault as constitutive of the relations of 
domination created through the power/knowledge nexus.  
To simplify, in arguing that power and truth are mutually constitutive, Foucault 
was essentially pointing out that the use of truth constitutes way to deconventionalize, 
thus reify, social knowledge, so that it is no longer contested and becomes part of the 
natural order of things (Haugaard 2012). Thus, once the social knowledge that sustains 
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particular relations of domination becomes processed through the mill of truth 
production by experts, consensus can be created between dominated and subaltern. 
Hence, when confronted with expert knowledge, which includes social science, the 
dominated will consent to their domination. However, various acts of resistance by the 
subaltern remain symptomatic of the fact that the apparent consensus masks underlying 
relations of domination. 
 Lukes’ account of the third dimension of power is implicitly premised upon the 
taken-for-granted view of the social sciences as yet another science. That is to say, the 
natural sciences constitute a repertoire of truth in the manner of natural science. 
However, as emphasized by you, Bent (Flyvbjerg 2001: 1-8), when measured by the 
same criteria as the natural sciences, the social sciences constitute a poorly performing 
relative – a third cousin, twice removed. This suggests that while truth may facilitate 
technological progress, with regard to the social sciences the dream of liberation from 
tutelage through truth is illusory. In fact, as demonstrated in Foucault’s histories, truth 
appears to be on the side of domination, silencing potentially resisting minorities into 
acquiescence.  
The above suggests siding with Foucault against Lukes. However, reversing the 
task of the enlightenment, unmasking truth as domination, entails a significant cost. As 
a number of notable political philosophers observed when the Foucault effect hit the 
Anglophone world (including Charles Taylor 1984, Nancy Fraser 1985 and Michael 
Walzer 1985), Foucault’s critique of truth makes it difficult to see how it is possible to 
move beyond social critique, to the affirmation of something normatively desirable. 
Any such move would invariably fall foul of the premises of Foucauldian critique 
itself, as any such affirmation entails its own truth claims. Those claims cannot be 
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exempted from the premises of critique. Hence, they must be interpreted as yet 
another, even subtler, will to domination.   
 As I interpret it, in some respects the phronetic method attempts to steer a 
middle course between Lukes (represented here, for the purposes of argument, as 
archetypal of conventional social science) and Foucault. In other respects it sidesteps 
the issue of the relationship between power and truth by focusing upon results 
measured by effects upon the social world. With regard to the latter, the validation of 
phronesis is measured relative to public reaction and the consequent capacity to change 
the world of political decision-making. 
 In accomplishing this task the conceptual tool of ‘tension points’ is key. You, 
Bent, use the analogy of splitting a rock with a carefully aimed moderate blow that hits 
a point of fracture, thus splits the rock with minimum of effort (Flyvbjerg 2012 p.100). 
In explaining tension points you quote Foucault, as follows: tension points are ‘lines of 
fragility in the present…. Which open up the space of freedom understood as a space 
of concrete freedom, that is of possible transformation’ (Foucault 1998: 449-50, quoted 
Flyvbjerg 2012: 100)  
 These lines of fragility take place through the problematization of points of 
discourse in a manner that brings about a state of affairs whereby taken-for-granted 
reality becomes problematized, so that it can no longer be taken-for-granted as the 
natural order of things. The objective of problematizing tension points is ‘precisely to 
bring it about that practitioners no longer know what to do, so that the acts, gestures, 
discourses that up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, 
difficult, dangerous (Michel Foucault quoted in Miller 1993: 235).’ (Flyvbjerg 2012: 
290) 
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 As is correctly observed by you, Stewart (Clegg and Pitsis 2012), this is 
theoretically commensurable with my own argument (Haugaard 2003 and 1997) to the 
effect that what Lukes has in mind with the third dimension of power should not be 
theorized in terms of true and false consciousness but using the conceptual tool of 
consciousness raising. Essentially, the social consciousness of social actors, used in 
routine reproduction of social order, is premised upon a consciousness that is largely 
tacit but also potentially discursive. To borrow conceptual vocabulary from Giddens 
(1984), actors have a vast and complex practical consciousness knowledge (habitus) 
that is highly routinized, and constitutes the core of everyday structuration practices. 
Above this there is discursive knowledge which floats in a sea of practical 
consciousness – right now I am discursively aware of my objective of explanation and 
dialogue with phronesis, which is premised upon a vast practical consciousness 
knowledge of the English language, academic conventions and so on. While the two 
forms of consciousness are conceptually separate, there is a potential free-flow of 
information back and forth between practical and discursive consciousness. When 
knowledge of social life is purely at the level of practical consciousness knowledge, it 
appears unproblematic, as part of the natural order of things. However, when 
articulated discursively there exists the potential for social critique. In becoming 
discursive, the structuration practices and the knowledge that sustains them become 
something that can be observed, discussed and evaluated. Thus the acts, gestures, 
discourses that up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, 
difficult, dangerous. In the process of consciousness raising social actors become 
strangers to themselves. What is natural and taken-for-granted becomes problematic 
and contested through becoming discursive. In this context the task of social critique 
becomes to create a discursive awareness of the natural order of things, so it appears 
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strange.  
In this type of critique the social scientist will only be effective if what they are 
stating discursively makes present a reality that accords with the already existent 
practical consciousness knowledge of social actors. If it does not ring true relative to 
their practical consciousness, the message will be ineffective. Thus truth is local. This 
is graphically illustrated by you, Bent, in regard to the opinion polls in which the 
general public were asked which figures for cost overruns were true, yours or that of 
the contractors, and the public overwhelmingly sided with your figures (Flyvbjerg 
2012 pp. 95-118). The media and policy success that your phronetic method has is 
symptomatic of the fact that what you describe accords with what the general public 
and politicians already know tacitly, at the level of practical consciousness.  
 From the above, it is obvious that I agree with the phronetic approach in many 
respects. However, I am not sure that your characterization of the social scientist is 
entirely correct and I think that in practice (as against theory) a phronetic approach 
must concede more to Lukes, and to conventional social science, than you 
acknowledge. Taking these correctives in turn. 
 In response to Simmons’ question, which was ‘‘What is not as clear is the 
extent to which [Making Social Science Matter] is calling on social scientists to get 
involved and do politics in lieu of merely studying politics . . . To what extent is 
Flyvbjerg urging social scientists to be social and political beings, to strive to be, in 
Bourdieu’s terms, virtuoso social actors?’’ (Flyvbjerg 2012: 287), your ‘unequivocal 
answer to Simmons’ question is ‘… that the phronetic call to social scientists is exactly 
to become virtuoso social actors in their chosen field of study and to do politics with 
their research…’ (Ibid). Following that you go on to critique the traditional idea of the 
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social scientist as a distanced observer and interpreter. In some respects I agree with 
this answer, in the sense that the phronetic researcher must become familiar with the 
minutiae of the social practices that they study. They must understand the practical 
consciousness knowledge the actors use. However, in becoming knowledgeable about 
their subjects, they cannot become indistinguishable from their subjects, as that would 
compromise the social scientist’s consciousness raising capacity. 
To explain by way of anecdote, this reminds me of a conversation I had with the 
British anthropologist, Richard Jenkins, whose specialism is studying Danes (Jenkins 
2011). After becoming an acknowledged expert in the local practices of Danes, he is 
often asked for advice by his subjects, Danes, on how to celebrate weddings, birthday 
parties and so on in a ‘real Danish way’. However, while Jenkins is more of an expert 
in the practices of being Danish than Danes themselves, he has not become a Dane. He 
is discursively aware of what it means to be Danish but his own practical 
consciousness is still recognizably Belfast, overlaid with English socialization. 
Consistent with this, like most traditional anthropologists, Jenkins regards it as 
essential that anthropologists study cultures different from their own. 
To confront actors with what they take for granted, to make them strangers to 
themselves, the social scientists must actually be a stranger in order to retain the 
capacity to make visible what appears as the natural order of things as un-natural and 
constructed. If the social scientist becomes just another politician or activist who 
internalizes the practical consciousness of those they study, they have lost the 
conceptual tools of social critique – making strange what previously appeared obvious. 
In that sense the social scientists have to be distanced from the society that they study. 
In response to Simmons, they should not simply become, yet another, local politician 
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or local virtuoso social actor. However, while this stranger, critiquing power, is 
separate from society, they are not necessarily separate in the distant, unengaged way 
of the traditional perception of the social scientist, which was modeled upon the natural 
sciences. 
 To come to my second point of critique, while I agree that social scientists 
should not claim access to some kind of transcendental truth claims, I think you both 
go too far in trying to distance yourselves from truth claims. I quote you, Stewart, 
agreeing with Bent: ‘… social science is non-paradigmatic: there are clearly periods 
when it appears as if there is a dominant paradigm but, we would argue, the 
mechanisms of its maintenance are above all political: they have to do with 
sponsorship, enrolment,….’ (Clegg 2012 p. 67; also Flyvbjerg 2001 pp. 30-2). In 
Making social science matter, you, Bent, describe social science in terms of ‘waves of 
intellectual fashion…’ (Flyvbjerg 2001 p. 30). While this is true to some extent of 
(bad) practice, it is a profoundly depressing pictureii, which, fortunately, constitutes an 
exaggeration. To use the phronetic method of identifying tension points against you, I 
will identify a ‘…tension between what is said and what is done…’ (Flyvbjerg et al 
2012 p. 295) in your own work, which suggest you do not really hold to an entirely 
rejectionist view of the enlightenment perception of social science as a method of 
unmasking domination through truth.  
In Making social science matter, you relate an incident in which you participated 
in a radio debate with the Aalborg alderman for planning and environment. The 
alderman pulled from his briefcase a sheet of statistics, which he waved it at you as 
proof that the numbers in your study were wrong. You write : 
This, of course, is as bad as it gets for a scholar. We are paid to be that group in 
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society which is best equipped to produce data, knowledge, and interpretations of the 
highest validity and reliability. This is the main basis of our credibility and existence. 
Consequently, if someone questions that credibility our existence is at issue. (Flyvbjerg 
2001: 157) 
This response is entirely consistent with the truth claims of conventional social 
science. In response to the alderman you ‘crossed your fingers for luck under the 
table…’ and answered that you were not responsible for any errors, unless they derived 
from faulty data from elsewhere. Then you made an important strategic move: you 
went to your office 
‘… and prepared a large package for the alderman containing raw computer 
printouts of my data and other details of my analysis plus a cover letter asking the 
alderman please to identify the errors he said I had made. Three weeks later the 
material was returned to me with a message stating that the alderman’s staff had been 
able to identify no errors.’ (ibid).  
Giving your data and methods to the opposing side, only makes sense relative to 
intersubjective view of truth production. As in the natural sciences, it does not matter 
who analyses the data, what the social context, the data stands on its own two feet. As 
in Habermas, you gave the reasons for your truth claims to your opponents and they 
conceded the veracity of what you said based upon convergence, forced upon them, 
through the power of truth. Truth forced your opponents to agree with something 
against their interests. It seems to me that, consistent with Lukes, you are raising the 
banner of truth against power and domination - and winning in that instance.  
Similarly, in your account of the use of the media to disseminate knowledge of 
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the complex process whereby mega-projects always over-run, you write: ‘Today it is 
basically impossible for project promoters to postulate certain costs, benefits or risks 
for their projects without taking our data into account’ (Flyvbjerg 2012 p.106). In 
other words, power and domination have to bow to the emancipating power of truth. 
Again, following Lukes (and Habermas), the banner of truth and reason is raised 
against power and domination.  
Do not misunderstand me: if we take Lukes and Foucault as paradigmatic of two 
opposing theoretical positions, I am certainly not solely siding with Lukes against 
Foucault. In fact, as my discussion of tension points suggests, I am sympathetic to 
large elements of Foucault’s analysis. Yet, it has to be acknowledged that, to 
summarize, first, the social scientist is not equivalent to the actors whom they study – 
they have to retain a reflective distance in order to be effective. That said, they can 
share some of the characteristics with politicians and activists, in trying can make a 
difference in the world they study.  Second, social science is more than simply 
following fashion, where all knowledge can be reduced to power and domination. If 
that were not the case, it would be impossible to raise the banner of truth against power 
and domination, which constitutes an integral part of the critique of domination and 
your practice of phronesis.  
Bent Flyvbjerg: I welcome this opportunity to respond to Mark's reflections on 
phronetic social science. I'm in general agreement with Mark's two key points that (a) 
social scientists need a reflective distance to the actors they study in order to be 
effective and (b) social science is (I would say ‘can be,’ for precision) more than 
simply following fashion. I have only minor comments on these points, which I will 
return to later.  
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 My main issue is with Mark's take on the well-known critique of Foucault that 
his problematizations of truth make it difficult to see how we may affirm something 
(actions, thoughts) as normatively desirable, because such affirmation would come into 
conflict with the premises of Foucauldian problematization itself, or so the critique 
claims. Mark seems to agree with this critique and concludes that Foucauldian 
unmasking of truth as domination entails a significant cost in this manner. Foucauldian 
problematization, or similar questioning of truth claims, is at the core of phronetic 
social science. Therefore, if Foucauldian problematization had the weakness regarding 
normative action that Mark and others argue then this would also be a weakness of 
phronetic social science. Fortunately this is not the case, as we will see and as further 
argued in Flyvbjerg (2001) and Flyvbjerg et al. (2012). 
 Mark and others pursuing this type of critique seem to think Foucault has a 
special problem regarding normative justification. But justification of actions by norms 
is not a problem pertinent to Foucault in particular. It is a problem for Mark, too, and 
for me and any philosopher and social scientist making claims about what should be 
done. This problem has haunted philosophy for millennia and is unresolved in the 
dominant tradition – running from Plato via Kant to modern rationalists – where the 
search for ultimate, universal norms has invariably ended up in metaphysics and other 
questionable leaps of faith. In a less known tradition – running from Aristotle through 
Machiavelli to Nietzsche and Foucault, the issue of normative justification has been 
elegantly solved by substituting for metaphysics a phenomenology of truth and power. 
In its original formulation, phronetic social science builds on the latter tradition, on 
phenomenology rather than on rationalism. 
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 Foucault said explicitly about norms that he thought (a) nobody has ever 
demonstrated that universal norms for justifying human action exist, and we are 
therefore better off proceeding as if they don't if we want to get our analyses right, and 
(b) nevertheless, humans, including Foucault, are perfectly capable of normative 
action. It seems to me that on this point Steven Lukes is not the ideal counterpoint to 
Foucault, as Mark would have it, Jürgen Habermas is. Habermas (1987: 276) famously 
dismissed Foucault’s studies as ‘relativistic, cryptonormative illusory science’ 
(emphasis in original). And the critique for relativism is correct, if by relativistic we 
mean unfounded in norms that can be rationally and universally grounded; which is 
what Habermas (1987: 294) means when he criticizes Foucault for not giving an 
‘account of the normative foundations’ for his thinking. By this standard, however, 
Habermas’ own work is also relativistic. As argued in Flyvbjerg (2001: 88ff.), 
Habermas has been unable to demonstrate that rational and universal grounding of his 
normative positions is possible, including communicative rationality and discourse 
ethics; he has only postulated such grounding. And Habermas is not alone with this 
problem. Despite more than two thousand years of attempts by rationalistic 
philosophers, no one has been able so far to live up to Plato’s injunction that to avoid 
relativism our thinking must be rationally and universally grounded. The reason may 
be that Plato was wrong. Perhaps the polarity relativism/rationalism is just another 
artificial dualism that makes it easy to think but difficult to understand. Such dualisms 
simplify things conceptually but with little reference to actual phenomena. Foucault's 
insight is that the horns of the dualism can be avoided by contextualism. Thus it is 
wrong to criticize Foucault, or other phronetic social scientists, for being relativists if 
we by relativistic mean ‘without norms’ or ‘anything goes.’ ‘I do not conclude,’ says 
Foucault (1984a: 374), ‘that one may say just anything within the order of theory.’ 
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 Foucault resolves the question of relativism versus rationalism by following 
Nietzsche (1974: 284-285) who says about historians and philosophers of morality that 
‘[t]heir usual mistaken premise is that they affirm some consensus of the nations ... 
concerning certain principles of morals, and then they infer from this that these 
principles must be unconditionally binding also for you and me; or conversely, they 
see the truth that among different nations moral valuations are necessarily different and 
then infer from this that no morality is at all binding. Both procedures are equally 
childish’ (emphasis in original). It is this either/or – either moral norms are universal 
and apply to all or no moral norms are binding – that underlies the critique of Foucault 
for being a relativist. But this position is as immature and untenable today as it was 
when Nietzsche was writing. Employing Nietzsche's line of reasoning, Foucault 
therefore rejects both relativism and rationalism and replaces them by situational 
ethics, that is, by context; Foucault’s norms are contextually grounded. Veyne (1997: 
230) rightly observed about Foucault’s contextualism, that anyone who equates 
contextualism with relativism’s ‘anything goes’ should imagine trying to ask the 
Romans to abolish slavery. The present effectively limits the possible preferences; 
humans cannot think or do just anything at any time. With direct reference to Kant and 
Habermas, Foucault (1984b: 46) says that unlike these thinkers he ‘is not seeking to 
make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science.’ 
 Distancing himself from rationalism and metaphysics does not leave Foucault 
normless, however. His norms are explicitly expressed in a desire to challenge ‘every 
abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the victims’ (Miller 1993: 316) and in 
this way ‘to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of 
freedom’ (Foucault 1984b: 46). Foucault makes clear this type of work is based on a 
Nietzschean ‘will to truth,’ that is, a ‘will not [to] deceive, even myself’ – which stands 
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at the core of Foucault’s ethics (Rabinow 1997: xxx, Nietzsche 1974: 282). Foucault 
here is the Nietzschean democrat, for whom any form of government – pluralist or 
totalitarian – must be subjected to analysis and critique based on a will not to be 
dominated or deceived, on voicing concerns in public, and on withholding consent 
about anything that appears to be unacceptable. Foucault’s norms are based on 
historical and personal context, and they are not idiosyncratic as they are shared with 
many people around the world. The norms cannot be given a universal grounding 
independent of those people and that context, according to Foucault. Nor would such 
grounding be desirable, since it would entail an ethical uniformity with the kind of 
utopian–totalitarian implications that Foucault would warn against in any context, be it 
that of Marx, Rousseau, or Habermas: ‘The search for a form of morality acceptable by 
everyone in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic to 
me,’ says Foucault (1984c: 37). In a Foucauldian interpretation, such a morality would 
endanger democracy, not empower it. Instead, Foucault focuses on the analysis of evils 
and shows restraint in matters of commitment to ideas and systems of thought about 
what is good for humans, given the historical insight that few things have produced 
more suffering among humans than strong commitments to implementing utopian 
visions of the good. 
 In place of universals, Foucault finds that our history endows us with the 
possibility to become aware of those social arrangements which create problems – 
oppressive relations of power, for instance – and those which create satisfaction, e.g., 
strong democracy. It follows that we have the possibility either to oppose or to 
promote these arrangements. This, and not global moral norms, is Foucault’s point of 
departure for social and political change. Foucault here builds his thinking directly 
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upon the practical question of what is good and bad for humans, which is the core 
question of Aristotelian phronesis, including in Aristotle's original formulation. 
 The basis for understanding and acting in the Nietzschean-Foucauldian sense is 
the attitude among those who understand and act, and this attitude is based neither on 
universals nor on idiosyncratic moral or personal preferences, but instead on a context-
dependent common world view and interests among a reference group, well aware that 
different groups typically have different world views and different interests, and that 
there exists no general principle by which all differences can be resolved and by which 
we would have a universal ‘we’ or Nagel's (1989) ‘view from nowhere.’ For Foucault, 
and for phronetic social science, the socially and historically conditioned context, and 
not fictive universals, constitutes the most effective bulwark against relativism and 
nihilism, and the best basis for action. Our sociality and history, according to Foucault, 
is the only foundation we have, the only solid ground under our feet. And this socio-
historical foundation is fully adequate to carry out the phronetic task, which, according 
to Foucault, is ‘to criticize the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral 
and independent; to criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which 
has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can 
fight them’ (Chomsky and Foucault 1974: 171). 
 Mark writes that the phronetic method ‘sidesteps the issue of the relationship 
between power and truth.’ From the above it should be clear I strongly disagree with 
this. In my analysis the situation is the exact opposite: the phronetic method tackles 
head-on the issue of power and truth with help from the strongest, most detailed, and 
most enduring phenomenology of power and truth that exists, namely that of 
Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and Foucault. This phenomenology shows power and truth to 
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be interrelated in human affairs, including in philosophy, to an extent where truth is 
power and power is truth. The phronetic method uncovers as unfounded, and moves 
beyond, the conventional obsession that power and truth must be separate phenomena 
and that truth must be rationally and universally grounded independently of power to 
count as truth, because more than two millennia of rationalist philosophy fails to show 
how this may be achieved.  
 I further disagree with Mark that the validation of phronesis is measured 
relative to public reaction and the consequent capacity to change the world of political 
decision-making, if Mark sees this as the only criterion for validating phronesis. A 
second criterion exists, which is just as important, namely meeting the conventional 
standards of validity for social science research. Mark is correct in pointing out that my 
response to the Aalborg alderman and to promoters of megaprojects is entirely 
consistent with the truth claims of conventional social science. This goes for not just 
these examples but for the phronetic approach as such, as argued in Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2012). The approach is anti-relativistic, as we saw above. The results of phronetic 
research may, and should, be confirmed, revised, or rejected according to the most 
rigorous standards of social science, and results are open for testing in relation to other 
interpretations. This does not mean that one interpretation can be just as good as the 
next, as relativism would have it, for each interpretation must be based on certain 
validity requirements. It does mean, however, that phronetic studies must be as 
prepared to defend such requirements as any other study. Mark says this is consistent 
with Lukes. I would add it is also in agreement with Foucault, who called himself a 
‘happy positivist’ and emphasized ‘methods drawn from the classical repertoire’ to 
ensure validity of his studies (Miller 1993: 211). However, Mark goes too far when he 
says that raising the banner of truth and reason against power and domination is 
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‘following Lukes (and Habermas).’ In my work, and in the original formulation of 
phronetic social science, the leading lights on this point are Machiavelli, Nietzsche, 
and Foucault, who have a considerably better analytics of power – and of the practice 
of change and the politics of the possible – than Lukes and Habermas, perhaps because 
the former have much more experience in dealing with empirical power than the latter. 
This is why Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and Foucault are so much more effective as 
guideposts for those of us who care seriously about changing relations of power in 
practice. This does not mean that Lukes and Habermas are of no value in fighting 
power and domination, as explained in Flyvbjerg (2001: 88-128), but to give them 
center stage in the context of phronetic social science is misleading and 
counterproductive, in my judgment. 
 I agree with Mark that Lukes' idea about true and false consciousness creates 
more problems than it solves. And I appreciate Mark's distinction between discursive 
knowledge and practical consciousness. I take this distinction to be similar to the one I 
make in Flyvbjerg (2001) between explicit and tacit knowledge in the account for how 
humans learn and how this relates to phronesis. However, I find Mark's concept for 
‘consciousness raising’ insufficiently distanced from Lukes' ideas in terms of its 
patronizing connotations. For my taste, it is slightly too high-handed to see social 
scientists tasked with ‘raising the social consciousness of social actors,’ in Mark's 
words, by transforming actors' tacit knowledge to discursive knowledge. I prefer to see 
the work of social scientists as being simply to bring more transparency to the things 
they study. This has the added advantage that transparency is a key concept in the 
millennia long tradition of democracy and democratization. Thus the work of social 
scientists may be seen as fitting with and contributing to this long-standing tradition. 
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 Mark explains that when he first read my description of social science as waves 
of intellectual fashion, this made him wonder if he should give up academia altogether. 
I've had the same concern but resolved that just because conventional social science is 
so unsatisfying does not justify giving up on all of social science. I agree with Mark 
that if all social science was just fashion, this would be a depressing situation. But the 
whole point of developing and consolidating phronetic social science has been to show 
there is an alternative way to that of the social science fashionistas, a way to survive 
and thrive in the social science academy for those of us who are allergic to the strange 
mix of metaphysics and natural science emulation that characterizes much of social 
science today. 
In sum, I agree with Mark that in order to be effective social scientists need 
reflective distance from the actors they study. I also agree that social science can, and 
ought to, be more than simply following intellectual fashions. Phronetic social science 
is an attempt to move beyond fashion. I disagree with Mark that Foucauldian 
unmasking of truth as domination entails a special cost in terms of normative 
justification. I hold that the Foucauldian-Nietzschean tradition elegantly solves the 
problem of normative justification by replacing untenable relativism and rationalism 
by contextualism. I further disagree that the phronetic method sidesteps the issue of the 
relationship between power and truth. I maintain that the phronetic method 
successfully tackles this issue head-on. I also disagree that the validation of phronesis 
is measured only relative to political change. This is just one criterion of two; the other 
is meeting the conventional standards of validity for social science research. Academic 
impact and policy impact are both crucial to phronetic social science. Finally, while 
Mark's ‘consciousness raising’ as the main task for social scientists might be an 
improvement on Lukes, I still find it slightly too patronizing. I prefer to see the task of 
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social scientists as simply bringing more transparency to what they study and to trigger 
action through transparency. This has the added advantage of solidly aligning 
phronetic social science with the millennia-long and highly successful project of 
democracy and democratization, giving even more leverage to an already powerful 
approach to social science. 
Stewart Clegg: In terms of the power debates that all three of us have been involved in 
for some time I think it is evident that there are some common grounds of agreement. 
First, we do not accept the view that power operates through obfuscation, the basic 
position Lukes takes with regard to the third dimension of power.  The third 
dimensional view of power is premised on a radical interiority: it is tied up with what 
people find themselves able to articulate and say, what their consciousness, defined in 
terms of normal discourses and language, enables them to think and feel. In other 
words, what we have is a kind of negative account: rather than shaping consciousness 
positively, through discourse, radical theorists such as Lukes (1974/2006) see power as 
prohibitory, negative and restrictive. If it were really more radical it would have to be 
about what people are able not only to think and to articulate but also to do in practice 
based on knowledge.  Foucault alerts us to the shift from consciousness per se to 
practice (even when, as in the case of the Panopticon, practice is based on an imputed 
consciousness of the possibilities of the other’s surveillance.) 
Second, the sole focus on the mind of the other in the radical view of power is 
mistaken, I think: as Gilbert Ryle (1966) wrote, if the other has a mind, all well and 
good, we can never know what is in it other than what they tell us, irrespective of the 
advances made in cognitive psychology and linguistics that have so impressed 
colleagues such as Castells (2009). And the owners of these minds can tell us anything: 
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dissembling, mistaken, misleading or authentically felt, it doesn’t matter. We cannot 
go beyond what the other says, writes or does. Where a contradiction is judged to exist 
between these practices of saying, writing and doing we cannot easily adjudicate other 
than through interpretive conventions that are contextually bound themselves.  
Third, and here I side with Bent’s position, no amount of implicit or explicit 
claims to ideal speech situations or similar devices can improve matters. It is the 
presence of intellectual utopias that is the problem producing very real dystopias of 
one kind or another, based on convictions and practices about consciousness (Pinha e 
Cunha, Clegg, Rego, and Lancione 2012).  
Fourth, I differ from Bent in saying that it follows that power and truth do not 
exist in an inverse relationship, whereby domination is reproduced through the 
obscuring of truth. There is no truth that stands incontrovertible and sovereign as a 
metric against which all contrary claims must fail. 
Fifth, more substantively, with Bent I am not so sure about Mark’s position on 
the relation of discursively practical and theoretical consciousness, despite having 
seemingly subscribed to it in part (Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips 2006). I accept that 
there is a potential dialogue that can occur between the positions that are held by 
individuals in their practical consciousness and attempts at reformation of this practical 
consciousness through an encounter with better argumentation, more persuasive data, 
or an expanded horizon of possibilities. However, it is not from the premises of reason 
alone as the social scientist would formulate them that such encounters occur. They 
take place in discursive spaces inscribed by passions and interests.  
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An example might make the previous point clearer. Rather than talk about ‘class 
interests’, the hoary old standby, I have chosen a highly contested topic to make the 
point, an issue about which it should be quite clear that in this context I intend to be 
completely agnostic. The argument is purely analytical. The topic at issue is the veil or 
niqab, usually worn with a burqua. In certain contexts, such as contemporary France, 
the state has sought to make the veil illegal, showing the contested nature of this 
garment. That the state has acted thus is immaterial to the analytical point I wish to 
make. The analytical point is that debates about an issue that is socially contentious in 
certain contexts, such as the wearing of the niqab in western societies such as France, 
cannot be adjudicated on the basis of greater transparency or a more rational argument.  
In terms of rational argument protagonists concerned with what women wear 
make other claims. Some claims suggest that wearing a garment such as the niqab is 
enslaving, keeping women in bondage, denying them their right to an individual 
existence (Habchi 2009). While such a claim is cogently grounded in Western norms 
of liberal individualism it is not an argument that will necessarily be persuasive for 
people whose social relations are, as a matter of fact, constituted differently.  From 
alternative perspectives different claims can be and are made. There is a positive 
argument that for reasons of modesty, privacy and respect, the wearing of the garments 
takes on a significance that is beyond the reason of medical science. From the liberal 
and feminist perspective the garment is a prohibitory and negative form of power; from 
a radical feminist and Muslim perspective the veil can be seen as empowering and 
positive (Allison 2011: 686-88; also see Ouazzif 2009 and Aziz 2012) and legal 
sanction against it in western societies as a form of Horkheimer and Adorno’s ‘false 
projection’ (Mancini 2012), an ‘Orientalism’ (Said 1978) that legitimates western 
forms of domination through stigmatizing the ‘Other’. 
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The will to dialogue between the practical consciousness of a wearer of the veil 
with critics, who might as easily be a radical feminist asserting her right to be veiled as 
much as one subject to repression as some Muslim feminists argue (Habchi 2009), is 
complex. The practical consciousnesses in play are already too deeply embedded in 
their respective and different theoretical consciousness to be easily informed; hence the 
power of Bent’s critique of Mark’s position as slightly too high-handed if it sees social 
scientists tasked with ‘raising the social consciousness of social actors’. It is easy to 
see why relativism might appear attractive: it allows for scholars not to be ‘Leninist’, 
as Mark suggests, as not engaging in ‘false projection’ in Mancini’s (2012) terms.  
The meaning and power effects of the veil and the burqua are contested, not least 
among the wearers themselves. The meaning of the veil is constantly contested, 
changing, and local (Ahmed 2011) and as such it is not possible to establish its power 
effects unequivocally by reference to the real interests of those who (choose to) wear 
it, whether under conditions of their own choosing or not. In fact, the notion of choice 
has little purchase here: where the veil has become part of the daily routine of dressing, 
a drill in Foucauldian terms, choice is irrelevant. Given the complexity of the circuits 
of power that frame matters of dress it seems difficult to imagine a circuit breaker that 
could settle debate. As Allison (2011: 688) concludes ‘wearing the veil is not in itself 
indicative of either oppression or emancipation. Rather it is the particular social, 
cultural, and political contexts in which the veil is worn and understood that will 
determine its meaning.’  
There is a flow in power studies that runs from Hobbes (1951) through Dahl 
(1957) and Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1963) to Lukes (1974) that has opened up 
many fruitful areas for debate such as non-issues, non-decision-making, and the 
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mobilization of bias. The second dimensional view of power remains an excellent way 
of understanding action and inaction, how some things happen and some others do not 
(see van Iterson and Clegg 2008 for an empirical case in point), even if the three 
dimensional viewpoint seems somewhat totalizing. Against the Hobbesian position that 
equates power and cause Bent would favour one that flows from Machiavelli (a 
position I agree with: see Clegg 1989), privileging a ‘phenomenology [that] shows 
power and truth to be interrelated in human affairs, including in philosophy, to an 
extent where truth is power and power is truth’ in which the task of ‘social scientists as 
being simply to bring more transparency to the things they study.’ The position is 
perfectly appropriate when viewed from the perspective of the disinterested social 
scientist as a subject position – but we need to consider the subject positions of those to 
whom the claim might be addressed. Implicitly we have already done this with the 
previous example of the veil.  
Bringing transparency to power is not just an act of heroic individualism on the 
part of the social scientist. Of course, we can make any claims and we can ground them 
as best we can but that does not mean that they will be taken seriously. As Bent 
observes in his study of Aalborg, rationality is a tool of the weaker parties in power 
relations and those who are the stronger can simply ignore it. In Australia, all citizens 
must, by virtue of citizenship, vote or provide an account of why they did not and be 
fined if they are unable to do so. As a feature of election campaigns there is a 
considerable amount of ‘fact-checking’ under way. In a feature article in The 
Guardian’s Australian online edition of July 16 there was an article by Bronwen Clune 
about fact-checking sites that have demonstrated transparently that claims being made 
by the two major antagonists in the election that was the underway are demonstrably 
false.iii Does this make any difference to the claims that are being made? It does not 
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seem to. The election campaign in this most democratic of countries – an elected 
Upper Chamber, the compulsion to exercise citizenship rights by being obliged to vote 
– does not depend on transparency and truth. On The Conversation website in July 
political scientist Sally Young of Melbourne University quoted an internal Labor 
report from the 1980s that described swinging voters as ''basically ignorant and 
indifferent about politics. They vote on instinct for superficial, ill-informed and 
generally selfish reasons.'' As these are the people who decide the outcome of the 
democratic process rather than the committed supporters of the major antagonists the 
parties seem quite content to repeat untruths transparently revealed to be such in order 
to attract these less hegemonically determined votes. Rationality is not necessarily an 
aspect of power when untruths and simplistic slogans can be deployed and re-
deployed, even when they are transparently and demonstrably false, as Bent also found 
in Aalborg (Flyvbjerg 1998). 
The point of the excursus into Australian politics is to stress that there is more 
than one subject position than that of the social scientist involved in any truth claim: 
there are also those at whom the claims are directed. For power researcher these are 
likely to be the more powerful and interested members of the context in question rather 
than the less powerful and uninterested (who in this context are the subjects at whom 
political parties’ power is oriented). Social scientists, or any other scientists for that 
matter, do not unilaterally determine truth claims. Truth claims, especially about the 
interests and actions of the powerful, will be an object of public contestation. The 
powerful have every interest in making them so if these truths reveal their role in 
affairs that they would prefer not to be public knowledge.  
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Democratic deliberation does not determine truth; in fact, such deliberation can 
produce more rather than less occlusion. No objective moral foundations for 
determining truth have been rationally argued to be universal and those reasonable 
grounds that social scientists and philosophers have formulated, such as Habermas’ 
(1971) ‘ideal speech situation’, cannot be made binding. There is too much in the way 
of an implicit equation between democracy and rationality, perhaps not as explicit as in 
Habermas (1989) but still evident in the position advanced. Being a social scientist is a 
social role – but so is that of being a newspaper proprietor (The Murdoch NewsCorp 
Press owns the vast majority of print media outlets in Australia and is hardly 
characterized by transparency, a love of truth, or a disdain for the distortions that 
power allows), a politician, or a political advisor. Hence, I am disinclined to accept the 
equivalence of ‘power’ and ‘truth’ that Bent proposes (on this occasion – in his 1998 
book I think his argument is closer to the one that I have made). Representations of 
truth do not determine power; it is power relations that determine what becomes 
legitimated as truth. 
Comparable to Mark and Bent I am equally ‘allergic to the strange mix of 
metaphysics and natural science emulation that characterizes much of social science 
today’; indeed, working in a business school as Bent and I both do, one finds the 
mixture particularly prevalent. Some truths and forms of producing them are far more 
favoured than others (Fournier and Grey 2001) both by the audiences that consume 
these truths and the authorities that validate them. Those that constitute their domain as 
‘critical’ of received truths have ways of being construed as ‘interesting’ but ‘not 
relevant’, as hardly ‘useful’, as ‘impractical’ and ‘overly theoretical’. 
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Bent proposes ‘the Foucauldian-Nietzschean tradition elegantly solves the 
problem of normative justification by replacing untenable relativism and rationalism 
by contextualism.’ Contextualism is something that is a social science construct. As 
such I accept its strictures but those whom one addresses, as I have explained 
elsewhere (Clegg and Pitsis 2013), may very well not and their non-acceptance can 
have major power effects both personally and in terms of the objective of transparency. 
Those addressed by those who presume to speak truth to power do not necessarily 
share contextualisms’ norms and have many ways of ignoring them as the fact-
checking examples suggest. The conventional validity standards for social science may 
be followed and accepted by the social science community but they are as nothing 
much more than social science solipsism if those to whom the analysis is addressed 
refuse the norms of engagement. As argued elsewhere (Carter, Clegg and Wahlin 
2011) when science meets strategic realpolitik it is science that tends to suffer, the first 
casualty being ‘truth’. 
Moving the essentially contested (Gallie 1956) meaning of power (Lukes 1974) 
via phronesis to the meaning of context does not settle matters unequivocally, for 
context in politically sensitive areas is no less likely to be contested. The context 
depends on the contested and contesting viewpoints that constitute it, as the case of the 
veil makes evident. Phronesis has its limits: it is not the solution (as Bent sometimes 
portrays it) but just an attitude, one of the possible ways of doing what we do, that 
allows one to produce contextual knowledge that is always partial but at least is 
grounded. I think that phronesis can be powerful if we state the limit of what we do 
and then we enter the field knowing that all we are going to say is contextual (not 
epistemic). As Lancione (2013: 154) suggests: ‘Phronesis is co-constituted by the 
researchers’ efforts to question their own knowledge (and their knowledge production), 
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and by the practice-based and discursive-based knowledge emerging from the 
studied context’. There is no necessary correspondence between these: indeed, the 
correspondence theory of truth fails the test of social science practice just as much as 
does the rival position that stresses the coherence of the models that knowledge 
produces, irrespective of their correspondence with states of affairs (McHugh 1971). 
The latter produces science fictions akin to the models of neo-classical economics; the 
former hands interpretive license to whatever temporally specific opinions prevail in 
particular empirical settings. 
The contexts in which phronesis might operate are not just constituted by the 
social scientist; they are already populated by many other actors, not all of whom will 
necessarily be well disposed to the social scientist’s accounts of their actions and 
practices. In other words, actors always populate contexts: as ethnomethodology 
insists, these are already theoretical actors with their own ways of making sense. 
Context is more than just the space in which the social scientists do their job: contexts 
are always already populated. The fact that context is populated is not a limit, or a 
problem, of phronesis – it is just the limiting condition within which phronesis must 
operate. We need to frame expectations around phronesis accordingly: it can do some 
things; it can't do some other things. That there are limits is not too much of an issue. 
Phronesis is not the solution to the nature/social science debate. Science is politics 
pursued by other means – so it matters not if that which is studied belongs to Society 
or to Nature.  Indeed, it will probably belong to both simultaneously, as in matters of 
software design, bridge design or any other form of design or analysis that can be 
considered in terms of being aesthetic, plausible, and replicable, the realization of 
which depends neither on natural law nor social construction but on the stabilization of 
those circuits of power that produce them, how they are configured, how effortlessly 
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they circulate, and what resistance they meet (Clegg, 1989). The nature of things or 
their social construction is nothing other than whatever it is that the circuitry of their 
power relations embeds them as being with the outcome depending on what skilled 
actors – people, things and hybrids (Latour 1993) do and achieve. 
Phronesis offers an attitude that enables us to assess better the fragility and 
contextuality of any claims regarding states of affairs. For reflexive and phronetic 
conceptions of science, rationality is always situational rather than transcendent. And 
because it is always contextually situational it is always implicated with power. No 
context stands outside power. If it were the case, then it would exist nowhere, outside 
of understanding, outside of possibility, outside of sense. However, as a general and 
guiding theoretical point I suggest that: 
The recognition of the ‘other’ is crucial: self-regarding behaviour in the 
absence of the recognition of the and by others is of no value in itself. 
On these criteria it is not the alleged ‘disinterestedness’ of a position 
that makes it worthwhile, but the degree of reflexivity that it exhibits in 
relation to the conditions of its own existence. Severing the 
conversational elements that nurtured the theory in the first place and 
which link it to practice makes it harder to attain this reflexivity. Thus 
we argue for the grounding of theoretical claims in local and specific 
circumstances rather than their radical and rapid translation out of 
them. In [a] world that is part of the social, which is inscribed with the 
materiality of words, and the indeterminacy of meaning, such 
conversational stretch is essential. Otherwise the paradigm closes, 
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conversational practice becomes monologue, and reflexivity declines 
accordingly (Clegg and Hardy, 1996: 701). 
Contextualism implies that whatever regularities occur empirically will always 
be situational. Researchers need to understand that these are not likely to be the result 
of either remote laws operating behind the backs of the actors concerned nor are they 
likely to be the result of an idiosyncratic researcher’s interpretation of the scene in 
question. To the extent that the researcher has researched the situational ethics of the 
context at hand then they will have a sound grasp of the socially and historically 
conditioned context within which sense is made. With these understandings 
researchers can avoid the relativism that they are sometimes charged with: their 
understandings will be framed within deeply embedded foundations that the actors find 
normal and acceptable to use. In matters of interpretation there is always room for 
disagreement and it is no different for the researcher. One interpretation is rarely as 
good as another. Some will always be more plausible in terms of the contexts within 
which they are produced and received and, depending on the context, some will be 
embraced and others spurned, which tells us nothing, necessarily, about the truth 
claims being constituted, although it might tell us something about the power relations 
inscribed in that context. As has been argued elsewhere, truth claims are managed 
contextually through discourses, time and space as well as through agency in terms of 
identity, capital and practices, conjoined through power relations (Gustavs and Clegg 
2010). In fact, the historical contexts and agency of power have been somewhat 
limited. That the histories we inherit have overwhelmingly been those of the dominant 
actors strutting their stuff in the various stages of the human comedy – the men, the 
whites, the colonialists, the rich, the powerful, the educated – is hardly surprising. Life 
on the margins, in service, bondage or slavery of one kind or another, rarely affords 
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room, time, or tools for intense reflection. Reflexive analysis is never innocent of 
context but situates itself on the boundaries between the seemingly possible and the 
impossible with the desire to shift these boundaries. Such a position is the ideal place 
from which to think differently in order to act differently, as Flyvbjerg (2001: 127) put 
it. Phronesis helps us to do that and should inform better dialogue than would occur in 
its absence. Accepting that while power is able to dictate truth one remains sceptical 
that truth is necessarily able to determine power.  
M.H.: To be provocative in my response: you both use crypto-normative and crypto-
truth arguments. Immanent in your approaches are certain norms and truth claims, 
which are absolutely central to your critique, yet these claims are denied by discursive 
adherence to Nietzschean radical contextualism. Like you, I hate utopian projects and 
one of the defining characteristics of utopian projects is the practice of self-exception. 
Claiming to critique domination without making explicit your own normative 
foundations, or claiming to make the practices of others transparent while claiming that 
you are not yourself making truth claims against domination, constitutes self-exception 
and self-deception. To show why, I wish to return to the foundation we share: power – 
not transcendental metaphysics! 
 We agree that there is no escape from power. In that sense Habermas’ 
characterization of ideal speech is mistaken. However, maybe we also agree that power 
is not necessarily normatively negative (which Habermas assumes). In the literature 
there is a tendency to conflate power with domination, which goes back to Weber’s 
definition of power. However, in its most general sense power constitutes simply a 
capacity for action, which is power to. Beyond that power over is not necessarily 
invidious (Haugaard 2012b). If, for instance, one party prevails over another in a free 
and fairly fought election the former is exercising power over the latter, but without 
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dominating them. Properly reformulated ideal speech is a situation in which there is 
legitimate power (to and over) but not power as domination (illegitimate power). 
 Foucault has made a great contribution by showing how modern practices of 
subject creation are constitutive of relations of domination. For instance, in his analysis 
of the Panopticon, he describes how a social subject becomes formed through 
continuous observation. The individual, as object of observation, is in a relationship 
that is essentially a one-way judgmental monologue. As a consequence, they come to 
see themselves through the eyes of other, and in so doing, shape their subject position 
as defined by that observing gaze. In advocating the Panopticon as a model of 
socialization, Bentham observes that one could use this method for pedagogical 
experiments. Using orphans one could ‘bring up children according to different 
systems of thought, making certain children believe that two and two do not make four 
or that the moon is a cheese, then put them together when they are twenty or twenty-
five…..’ (Foucault 1977: 204). Thus the ‘Panopticon is a privileged place for 
experiments on men, and for analysing and for analysing with complete certainty the 
transformations that may be obtained from them.’ (ibid). The reader is appalled, but 
why? Why is it wrong? To reply that it reveals domination is evasive, as this is not 
self-evident. 
 To see the latter point better, let us for moment recall Mead’s account of 
socialization (1967). Much like Freud, he argues that the self becomes socialized 
through being able to take the perspective of other: the I and the me (ego and super-
ego). Whether these accounts of socialization are empirically correct is not the point, 
the description of self-subjectification is not normatively objectionable. It is not 
inherently normatively objectionable that some one learns to objectify themselves 
	   33	  
through the eyes of other. Neither is it objectionable that a child is sufficiently 
disciplined that they learn that two and two makes four.  
 The problem for Foucault is that self-subjectification is inherent to socialization 
in general (Lukes’ critique of Foucault 2005: 97) – good and bad. Unless we are some 
kind of naïve believers in an untainted state of nature (a state of being without power 
of any kind), we have the messy task of distinguishing socialization as empowerment 
from domination.  
How does Foucault’s critique work? It works cryptonormatively, in the sense 
that Foucault expects his readers to supply the normative evaluation. When we read 
that the Panopticon can be used in experiments upon people, we are appalled because 
immanent in our moral judgements (even if not discursively acknowledged) is the 
Kantian moral principle that people should be an end in themselves, not a means to an 
end. Bentham’s project constitutes a classic utopian project that sacrifices people for a 
higher end.  
 I am perfectly happy to admit that the Kantian principle that people are ends in 
themselves, and not a means to an end, is a liberal principle – a product of a specific 
civilization. It is the product of a way of being-in-the-world that bases its norms on the 
normative idea that the ordinary life counts; that the life of everyone is of equal value. 
This is at variance with gemeinschaft feudal civilizations, which esteem only the great, 
and hold that ordinary people should be sacrificed upon the altar of the welfare of 
elites or great causes. It is also at variance with some of the foundations of the great 
monotheistic religions, in which martyrdom is considered the highest good. Sacrificing 
one person for the sins of others (Jesus on the cross) is incommensurable with these 
liberal principles.  
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 Accepting that it is not possible to identify domination, distinguishing it from 
freedom and emancipation, without normative principles that transcend context, does 
not imply that the principles themselves are immune from critique or that they are 
inherently universally valid. All these principles have to be held from a perspective of 
what Rawls called reflective equilibrium (1993: 8), whereby we move from the 
principles to their application and back again. Thus they are open to falsification.  
 The principle that a person is an end in themselves is based upon the other 
Kantian principle, that law should be universal, or generalizable. Again that is 
particular to modern liberal society. In the feudal system, every status position had a 
law particular to it. So, the law did not apply in exactly the same way to a feudal 
aristocrat, as it did to a serf. Justice was not universal (with a small ‘u’) inside the 
society as a whole. Consequently, liberal principles are not Universal (with a capital 
‘U’) in the sense of applying irrespective of interpretative horizon, or culture. 
However, the generalizability criterion is universal (small u) within liberal democratic 
theory, in the sense that it is immanent in all liberal democratic theory and practice. I 
have yet to see a form of contemporary social critique, including contextualist, which 
was convincing, that did not presuppose this principle. Of course, I am open to 
falsification on this. 
 When we think of Habermas’ account of ideal speech or Rawls’ account of the 
original position, we should not think of them as utopias – liberal attempts to make 
alternative utopias to Plato’s Republic or Marx’s vision of communism. Rather they 
are ways to distil the essence of the abstract principles that are immanent in the 
normative evaluations that are made within the liberal democratic tradition of social 
critique.  We have an intuition that teaching someone that two and two makes five 
constitutes a fundamental violation of the other but it is not self-evident why. Kant’s 
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second categorical imperative is the discursive formulation of what we know at the 
level of practical consciousness (this is an example of what I mean by consciousness 
raising, not something condescending). Of course, Kant thought of his principles as 
some kind of fundamental Universal transcendental principles. He is mistaken in that 
belief but has come up with principles that are immanent in liberal democratic 
theorizing. 
Stewart, the idea that the ‘state of the exception’ is normatively objectionable 
comes back to these Kantian principles. It is objectionable that the law is suspended for 
some people, as in S-21 extermination camp, and that they should be used as a means 
to the end of justifying the Cambodian Khmer Rouge utopian project. These basic 
Kantian normative principles are immanent in your account of S-21 extermination 
camp (Cuhna, Clegg, Rego and Lancione, 2012). Bent states that ‘the Foucauldian-
Nietzschean tradition elegantly solves the problem of normative justification by 
replacing untenable relativism and rationalism with contextualism.’ But you do not 
accept the contextuality of Khmer Rouge. If you did, you would judge them by their 
moral criteria. Rather, you judge them by liberal democratic criteria.  
In the case of your analysis of the niqab, your contextualism does not entail a 
rejection of liberal principles either, as you seem to think. You write ‘From the liberal 
and feminist perspective the garment is a prohibitory and negative form of power; from 
a radical feminist and Muslim perspective the veil can be seen as empowering and 
positive (Allison 2011: 686-88; also see Ouazzif 2009 and Aziz 2012)…’ (italics 
added). The issue for you is: what does wearing the veil mean? Does the signifier 
niqab entail power as domination or emancipation? Liberals read it one way and 
radical feminists and some (not Ayaan Hirsi Ali (2007), nor the members and 
supporters of Stealthy Freedoms of Iranian Women Facebook pageiv) Muslims read it 
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differently. However, on behalf of all parties you assume the liberal principle that 
children should not be forced to wear clothes that are demeaning. This is not a deep 
conflict about fundamental moral principles. It is not a conflict between the normative 
rightness of the obedience of women to God and man versus liberal principles of 
autonomy. As presented by you, the point is the much more shallow conflict 
concerning the meaning of the signifier niqab. In a multicultural context, such as 
France, some women often choose (principle of autonomy) to wear the veil as sign of 
their difference (freedom of expression). Therefore, we cannot assume, and should not 
assume on behalf of other, that wearing the niqab is symptomatic of domination.  
 Just as with liberal principles, you also use truth against domination. When it 
comes to power and truth, Bent, you write that I go ‘too far when [I say] that raising 
the banner of truth and reason against power and domination is “following Lukes (and 
Habermas).” In my work [Flyvbjerg], and in the original formulation of phronetic 
social science, the leading lights on this point are Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and 
Foucault,…’ That is not a proper refutation – you are dodging an argument that is 
irrefutable as far as I can see by reference to authority (the big names of Machiavelli, 
Nietzsche, and Foucault). Let us put this in power terms: you, an academic, confront a 
powerful actor (the alderman backed by business interests) with a large packet of data 
and ‘Three weeks later the material was returned to me with a message stating that the 
alderman’s staff had been able to identify no errors.’ What exactly happens there? You 
have prevailed over the Alderman and his cronies, using the weapon of truth. Truth has 
prevailed over domination.  
In this regard, your proposition, Stewart, that ‘it is power relations that determine 
what becomes legitimated as truth.’ is also falsified by Bent’s actions – unless you 
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claim that Bent was the powerful one dominating the corporate business interests of 
Aalborg!  
Furthermore, I do not know what it means to say that phronesis meets ‘the 
conventional standards of validity for social science research…’ unless you are willing 
to give up the view that truth is inextricably tied to power as domination. If we take 
Popper’s arguments that our principles are only true to the extent that they are not 
falsified (Popper 2002), as our measure of conventional science, this would hold with 
Habermas’ view that we should only be persuaded by nothing other than the force of 
the better argument (truth). It seems to me that you are conceding defeat here, but not 
openly so. You are deliberately vague by appealing to something amorphous – ‘the 
conventional standards’ – what conventional standards, precisely? 
Both of you appeal to transparency; what does transparency mean? If we 
consult the dictionary (as an example of ordinary usage, not authority), it means the 
quality of being transparent, which in turn means ‘being capable of transmitting light 
so that the object can be seen as if there were no intervening material’ (American 
Heritage Dictionary: 1364 – other dictionaries say something similar). Now it may be 
that you use transparency in a stipulated way that does not accord with this usage – a 
legitimate move. However, I do not find any textual evidence for that. So, what are 
these intervening materials that distort in the case of social life? I cannot see how you 
can get away from the kind of distortions that Habermas had in mind or from phronesis 
as a kind of ideology critique. 
In your criticism of the City Centre Group (the board responsible for planning 
in downtown Aalborg) you, Bent, find it normatively reprehensible that the group 
comprises two professional groups and one private interest group - that the Chamber of 
Industry was in there among the democratic power of elected representatives and the 
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executive power of the police (2001: 147). Surely the normative force of this criticism 
derives from the fact that this is a deviation from fundamental liberal normative 
principles of neutrality? The problem is that ‘the Chamber was the most important 
player in city politics and planning in Aalborg.’ (2001:147). Why is this objectionable? 
It is objectionable because it violates three of the four principles of Habermas’ account 
of what it means that the force of the better argument should win - and it violates 
Rawls’ account of justice. It violates the principle that ‘existing power differences 
between participants must be neutralized such that these differences have no effect on 
the creation of consensus.’ (Habermas, as presented in Flyvbjerg 2001: 91). It also 
violates the first principle that all relevant parties should be consulted, and the second 
that all participants should have an equal chance to present validity claims. 
Habermas’ list of criteria for ideal speech includes the principle that 
‘participants must openly explain their goals and intentions and in this connection 
desist from strategic action (transparency).’ (Flyvbjerg 2001: 91)v. I would ask you to 
give me an example of transparency, however contextualist, that does not presuppose 
implicitly within it that ‘participants must openly explain their goals and intention’.  
To return to the example of the niqab, Stewart, you argue that it constitutes a 
‘false projection’ (Mancini 2012), an “Orientalism” (Said 1978), that legitimates 
western forms of domination through stigmatizing the “Other”’. What is wrong with 
stigmatising the other or false projection? What are the underlying normative 
principles here? I would put it to you that what is wrong is that it precludes listening to 
the other – point three of ideal speech for Habermas: participants must be willing and 
able to empathize with each other’s validity claims (ideal role taking).’ (Habermas in 
Flyvbjerg 2001: 91). Also, note your use of the word false above – another use of truth 
against domination. 
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In the mega-projects book (2003) you, Bent, show that the financial estimates 
of mega-projects are nearly always much too low. It seems to me the rhetorical force of 
this only works if you presuppose, with Habermas, that social actors should ‘openly 
explain their goals and intentions’. I would further point out, that by showing how 
incorrect (untruthful) the estimates are, you are making a truth claim, against the power 
of vested interests. 
If Habermas got it wrong in his five principles, and phronesis is about 
transparency, there must be instances of transparency that do not conform to these 
principles. I challenge you to give me a contextual instance of transparency that, for 
instance, entails participants disguising the goals and intentions. It seems to be obvious 
that to the extent to which actors disguise their goals and intentions the process is not 
transparent and is normatively reprehensible, whatever the context! 
A couple of different points and parenthetically: in your critique of Habermas 
you, Bent, quote Machiavelli, who writes “One can make this generalization about 
men: they are ungrateful fickle, liars and deceivers.” (Quoted Flyvbjerg 2001: 93). 
First, I find these kinds of essentialist claims totally suspect, and so should any 
follower of Foucault. Second, why should we care what Machiavelli (or Nietzsche) 
says? Because he is famous? Dead for a long time? Part of the canon of Western 
political theory? In the pages which follow you similarly argue from authority, most 
explicitly in the following: ‘Agnes Heller, Albrecht Wellmer, Herman Lubbe, and 
Niklas Luhman have expressed similar criticism of discourse ethics.’ (2001: 96). 
Imagine replacing these names with Donald Duck, would the argument hold? No! 
Okay, you may reply that these people are more observant that Donald Duck, but I 
could equally compile a long list of famous theorists who agree with Habermas, which 
would prove nothing.  
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To reiterate, I am not claiming that Habermas or Kant discovered some kind of 
Universal principles, described utopia, or that they are Authorities we should bow 
down to. What I claim is that these principles, or something close to them, underpin the 
critical edge and coherence of Foucault’s work and, also, your works, despite claims to 
contextualism. These liberal democratic principles do not underpin the normative 
foundations of feudalism, which presupposed essentialism for its justification. I have 
no problem in sticking my neck out by saying that liberal democratic society is 
normatively more just than feudal society, when viewed from the perspective of the 
welfare of its weakest members. Normatively I am not a contextualist: I am not 
impressed with the Great Chain of Being, with the word of God, sacred texts or 
arguments from authority. These are reifications that have been (and still are) used to 
justify domination. However, I am a contextualist at the level of meaning, which 
entails that we should take account of the possibility that, due to diversity of language 
games, it is quite likely that the other does not attribute the same meaning to signifiers 
as we do – it is important to understand what the niqab means to those that wear it. 
The point you make, Stewart, that there are many instances when truth and 
normative rightness are defeated by direct coercion is, of course, empirically true. 
Power often entails simple coercion or deceit. However, the most effective forms of 
power are those that the less powerful actors consent to. They either consent because 
of normative rightness and truth or because they have been manipulated into believing 
that compliance entails normative rightness or truth. Unmasking the latter entails 
critique of power in its third and fourth dimensions - transparency. This strategy works 
because these principles are deep, so deep that even vice pays tribute to them. 
Obviously, not every exposure is successful. We are fifty years after Martin Luther 
King’s famous speech:  
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Five score years ago a great American in whose symbolic shadow we stand 
today signed the Emancipation Proclamation. This momentous decree is a great 
white light of hope to millions of Negro slaves who had been seared in the 
flames of withering injustice. It came as a joyous daybreak to end the long 
night of their captivity. But 100 years later the Negro still is not free. 
       
King continues: 
In a sense we have come to our nation's capital to cash a check. When the 
architects of our Republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and 
the declaration of independence they were signing a promissory note to which 
every American was to fall heir. (King 1963: 1) 
 
King states that for 100 years since the Emancipation Proclamation, and 200 
from the signing of the Constitution, those arguing for the civil rights of blacks in the 
USA had suffered massive defeats. Yet, King’s speech constituted a decisive turning of 
the tide in favour of civil rights. Why? The image of cashing a check is key. King was 
not introducing new normative principles contextual to black society. Rather, he was 
tapping into the already existent liberal democratic principles, which frame American 
politics. He was using the principles immanent in the political process, to expose a 
fundamental hypocrisy. Despite two hundred years of defeats, this was a powerful 
weapon of the weak, and still is.  
It is true that there are still black ghettoes but, when viewed over a longer 
historical time frame, from slavery to the election of Obama, there has been significant 
progress in the direction of social justice. This progress was not made by confronting 
coercion with coercion (the Black Panthers). It was done more subtly, by constantly 
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exposing the contradictions and discrepancies between the practice of politics and the 
normative liberal democratic principles that are immanent in these practices. 
  To sum up, like Bent, I am not that impressed with many of the philosophical 
underpinnings of Kant’s principles. They read as overly metaphysical. Kant is not 
author of sacred texts – an Authority. What impresses me about the categorical 
imperatives is the fact that they cut through most utopian projects. Do these principles 
work? This means, have they been falsified and can they be used to fight domination? 
Yes, I cannot think of a significant falsifying instance, where these principles are not 
immanent in critique and, as the example of King demonstrates, these principles are 
effective against domination.  
I do not see how we can practice social critique without such principles. How 
can one distinguish domination from freedom? If we criticize society, we must be 
prepared to say why. The Foucauldian contextualist ruse of avoiding these normative 
questions is cryptonormative in the sense that the theorist is relying on well-known and 
internalized liberal principles without justifying them, thus making an exception of 
themselves.  
Similarly, the critique of the use of truth for the purposes of domination, 
presupposes that it is possible to use truth against power as domination. Bent’s use of 
statistics is one such example. Truth is frequently used for the purposes of reinforcing 
power as domination, but this use is strategic and deceptive. Sometimes the use of truth 
is also motivated by a genuine desire to empower. The former use is parasitic upon the 
latter. The strategic use of truth only works by making a process somehow not fully 
transparent. As a consequence, the less powerful actors consent to power over that they 
would not if they were properly informed. The practice of Foucauldian critique is part 
of providing such proper information, which includes a realization that the systems of 
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meaning that we take for granted, and often reify, are conventional, thus could have 
been otherwise. Thus, the practice of Foucauldian critique, as distinct from the 
incoherent contextual aspirations derived from Nietzsche, falls within the parameters 
of Popperian truth claims, Frankfurt school critical theory, critique of ideology and the 
conventional normative liberal perspectives of justice, as exemplified by Habermas 
and Kant - interpreted as theorists of normative immanence, not utopia. 
S.C.: Just a few points. With respect to Popperian truth claims, Frankfurt school 
critical theory, critique of ideology and the conventional normative liberal perspectives 
of justice, as exemplified by Habermas and Kant, my view is that these are essentially 
moral philosophies of science – they are all stipulative of how one should practice 
science according to the moral precepts of the philosopher in question, be they in thrall 
to physics, Marx or Kant. Stipulating how science should be done morally is no 
substitute for observing how it is done as a practice. Those who have closely observed 
the practice tend not to find much evidence of abstract moral philosophy in play. For 
clarification, it is not I but Mancini who suggests the idea of ‘false projection’ and of 
course, it is Said who warns of Orientalism. Clearly, both terms have shaped debate. 
The idea of false projection notion, derived from Adorno and Horkheimer, has to do 
with the projection of one set of domain assumptions on to a context in which those 
domain assumptions are inappropriate. 
What is at issue with the example of the niqab or veil, as Mark rightly says, is 
what it means and to whom it means what it means. From the liberal perspective it is 
difficult to see that it cannot mean other than an instance of subjugation and 
domination. If women who wear the niqab consent because of normative rightness and 
truth then these norms and their associated truth are contextual; if they have been 
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manipulated, to use Mark’s term, into believing that compliance entails normative 
rightness or truth it would seem most difficult to establish that domination is at work. 
The problem is an old one – how to distinguish between an authentic and an 
inauthentic consensus without making a claim of theoretical privilege to differentiate 
between them.  
The subject, neither from the liberal perspective nor from the contextual 
perspective of a faith-full upbringing and its community norms, even when transposed 
to European urbanity, cannot be said to be manipulated without having shown 
resistance to the practice of the veil.  Simply to wear the veil because one has worn it 
since puberty cannot in itself be said to be manipulative from within the context of its 
normative order. The conditions of choice do not apply. The subject’s consumer 
sovereignty as one free to choose cannot be assumed. No choice is being foresworn 
without their being some act of resistance to the practice of veiling. Simply to be veiled 
is not something that Habermasian, Kantian or Republican norms can determine in 
terms of freedom or domination. Such conceptions do not enter into habituated 
choices. Should a woman choose not to wear the veil when she has previously done so 
and attracts faith community calumny in so doing, then the choice to do so may be 
seen as a form of resistance, and she makes a choice; likewise, with a decision to wear 
the veil as a choice made by one who previously did not. 
From post-enlightenment perspectives wearing the veil is unlikely to be seen as 
being in the real interests of the wearer. Real interests are not always problematic: for 
instance, the clinician who advises that the consumption of trans fats leads to the risk 
of obesity or that the consumption of cigarettes leads to the risk of cancer, can easily 
show that these practices act against the interest of the person following these 
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practices, using the determinations and arguments of medical science to do so. Of 
course, this means one accepts the reason of medical science, something that, in the 
short rather than the long term, may be contingent on power/knowledge relations, as 
Foucault (1973) realized. However, not all medical science is revocable and neither of 
the cases that I have mentioned seems likely to be so treated. So, in matters of medical 
science, we accept the arbitration of truth claims by objective and external reference. 
Truth claims are not all of a piece, however.  
 In the case of the veil, while one might argue that it is against the interests of a 
woman to subjugate her identity in all enveloping garb, there is no sense in which there 
is a scientific arbiter that one can use as a standard. In a phrase, either you’ve got faith 
or unbelief. In such contexts where habit, norms and choice are embedded in faith, 
listening to the other, point three of ideal speech, is just not occurring. So we have to 
ask why the other does not listen to reason. Is it because they cannot do so because 
their reason, and thus their choice, is occluded by the norms and habits of what they 
and significant others in their circle construe as faith? If the latter, then how can one 
assemble the situation as one of power practices?  I feel some sympathy with Steven 
Lukes’ (2005) critique of Foucault’s theory as a conflation of socialization theory.  
 Putting the example in context are these remarks from Salma Yaqoob when 
she says, “I think you should stand up for choices that you wouldn't necessarily choose 
for yourself, or that you even dislike. It's highly patronising and dangerous to impose 
your views on everyone else ... You get men sermonising away, and then also, in the 
name of feminism, women telling other women what to do, not aware of the irony of 
taking on that paternalistic and patronising saviour syndrome. That's what we fought 
against with patriarchy – men telling us what they think is best for us – and then you 
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have women telling other women what they think is best for them." 
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/16/veil-biggest-issue-uk-niqab-debate). I 
agree: liberals may not think wearing the veil to be in the wearer’s real interests but 
they should not want to prohibit anyone from wearing it. Truth claims hardly enter into 
matters of faith but faith, as a potent belief system, is clearly a major form of ideology 
but one whose effects, in terms of the espousal of dogmatic and revelatory versions of 
the truth, precludes reason defined in Kantian, Habermasian and liberal terms.  Even in 
what Mark calls weak contextualism characterized by multiple language games, not all 
of them have family resemblances. Of course, the alternative is not full-blooded 
acceptance of Schutz’s phenomenology, grounding meaning in the subjects’ own 
understandings as an ultimate arbiter: nonetheless, subject’s meanings are important, 
must be understood and sometimes accounted for in terms other than those that the 
subject is disposed to believe.  
There is a fundamental problem with trying to resolve scientific questions via a 
democratically discursive approach. It presumes rationality. In a world in which the 
ideal of scientific knowledge held true the judgments of expert knowledge would 
determine the facts of the matter, irrespective of community opinion. However, in 
many areas of the social sciences, and increasingly in natural science areas such as 
climate change research, we do not operate in the world of the Enlightenment. The 
standard model for scientific truth claims is that which Hamilton (2013) terms the 
“information deficit” model of classical science that says, “people act irrationally 
because their knowledge is deficient. Yet facts are no match against deeply held 
values, the values embedded in personal identity.” In any account of people’s ‘real 
interests’ that is non-trivial, whether dealing with religiosity, the body or climate 
change, the specification of what these interests are and the appropriateness of the 
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science that establishes them is not something that democratic deliberation can 
establish. It is not a matter of the ‘choices’ made by subjects that is important – to eat 
unhealthily, to risk cancer, to cut oneself off from the ‘normal’ sense of community in 
the external world – but of the relation between these as value based and the 
determination that would be made by one committed to rationality who does not 
adhere to these values. Lukes’ relativism of the liberal, reformer and radical does not 
help here because it merely specifies (some of) the variable grounds on which 
assessment of practices that are values based are made. It does not help one determine 
what the ‘real’ interests are. Implicitly, Lukes presumes that the radical has a closer 
relation to the truth of the matter than the liberal or conservative.  I doubt that such 
determination is possible; additionally, I doubt that making such determinations and 
seeking to have an exchange between practical and theoretically informed 
consciousness counts for much because, as Hamilton suggests,  “the debate ploy” may 
seem entirely reasonable but such an approach only works if the intended audience can 
effectively assess the arguments presented. Commitment to values above reason 
precludes this approach. Hence, to concur once more with Bent’s position on the 
Aalborg case, rationality as a device is weak when confronted with entrenched power 
and values. The contextually powerful will ignore or evade reason when it suits their 
values to do so.  
Martin Luther King was a skilled rhetorician, schooled in Baptist rhythms, a 
great orator. But did one speech constitute a decisive turning point in civil rights? I am 
not sure any speech could have such a role – the subsequent assassination of King and 
the riots and conflagration in the cities that followed, may well have had as much 
impact in putting black civil rights, as a non-issue, onto the agenda of mainstream 
politics as an issue. Finally, with respect to the death camps, systematic killing of 
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people is evil, especially in the name of ideology. The extinction of life itself on the 
basis of categorical discrimination is unfortunately not something that liberal principles 
inoculate against: as Mann (2011: 38) states, “Between them the British, French and 
Dutch fought over 100 separate wars between 1870 and 1914, almost all in their 
colonies, and European children read adventure stories lauding the heroism of soldiers, 
sailors and colonial administrator. War was normalized in this culture.” The culture 
had an integral calculus in which the other to the enlightenment tradition was 
disposable and outside of reason.  
In conclusion, I think that conceptions of power have to steer a course between 
two potential dangers: on the one hand, the imputation of interests made on the basis of 
theoretical consciousness; on the other hand, the conflation of socialized habit to a 
result of power effects. Weak contextualism does seem the best way forward: with 
Salma Yaqoob I am insecure about the merit of proffering analysis of other people’s 
problems as I define them and they do not. With Lukes, I am concerned that we do not 
take the mechanisms of habit formed through socialization as power effects. In both 
cases, I would not expect that others would necessarily accede to the Habermasian 
norms that Mark elaborates. In the absence of an acceptance of these norms as an a 
priori, it is difficult to see how theoretical consciousness can maintain an effective 
dialogue with practical consciousness. 
B.F. Mark comes out swinging by claiming Stewart and I are subject to 'self-
exception and self-deception', because we, according to Mark, (a) critique domination 
without making explicit our own normative foundations and (b) claim we are not 
ourselves making truth claims against domination. But Mark is wrong on both counts. I 
make my normative foundations explicit throughout my work, including above with 
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the quote from Foucault that defines the normative foundation of phronetic social 
science as, 'to challenge "every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the 
victims".' If something is not explicit about this, the onus is on Mark to explain what it 
is. Second, to the best of my knowledge I have never claimed I do not make truth 
claims against domination, as Mark says, so he needs to tell me specifically where he 
thinks I made these claims so we can address the issue. In my own understanding, I 
have repeatedly made the exact opposite claim in my work, namely that this is best 
seen precisely as truth claims against domination, and, moreover, the truth claims I or 
other phronetic social scientists put forward must live up to the same criteria for 
validity and reliability that apply to truth claims from other work in the social sciences. 
However, I do not claim to make objectivist, universal truth claims, which may be 
what throws Mark, because in my analysis no one has demonstrated such claims may 
be supported, as argued above. But that is not the same as not making truth claims. 
Mark is fighting a straw man here, twice over. 
From reading Mark's second round of comments above I now understand that 
Mark, too, is not making universal truth claims. Mark explicitly states that 'liberal 
principles are not Universal (with a capital U)'. He then goes on to make an inelegant 
rhetorical maneuver that gives his game away, when he says, 'However, the 
generalizability criterion is universal (small u) within liberal democratic theory'. In 
short, Mark wants to have his cake and eat it. But to be 'universal within' something is 
an oxymoron. It is similar to saying the universal exists within local boundaries, which 
is nonsensical by the usual standards of philosophy of science. Principles and theories 
may be universal or local, and to be local is defined precisely by existing only within 
certain bounds. As a consequence, to be 'universal within' something is at best to be 
local, in which case we should call it that based on the epistemological principle of 
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calling a spade a spade. At worst, to be 'universal within' seems to be an obfuscation, 
serving as a false security blanket for those who are unwilling to give up on the 
comfort of the illusion of having something outside their socio-historical context in 
which to ground their beliefs and actions. The history of philosophy, and indeed of 
humankind, shows this sentiment to be persistent and all-too-human, and as such very 
understandable. Nevertheless, Mark's idea of being 'universal within' seems to me as 
imaginary as the emperor's new clothes and serving the same purpose: to give the 
illusion that the emperor, here Mark and other scholars unwilling to let go of the idea 
of universals, is not stark naked. 
In a more positive interpretation, I welcome Mark's giving up on Universals with 
a capital U, because to me this is giving up on universals, period. It's an important step 
beyond Kant and Habermas, the latter explicitly and pretentiously calling his 
'universalization principle' 'U' with a capital U (Habermas 1990: 120-21). What I now 
hear Mark saying is simply, 'I consider myself part of a group that subscribes to the 
principles of liberal democratic theory and practice'. I'm happy to join Mark in this 
group to fight the abuse of power by better understanding and better implementing 
democracy, even though I might want to emphasize more than Mark does here what I 
see as serious weaknesses, inequalities, and environmental strains in the way liberal 
democracy is currently practiced. Moreover, I agree with Mark that, despite flaws and 
setbacks, liberal democracy is a remarkably successful social and political project and 
a project worth working for. But this brings us straight back to Foucault, because our 
agreement, if it is there, is plainly us as a group of people deciding collectively, and 
therefore non-idiosyncratically, in our specific socio-historical context that these are 
our norms, this is what we want to work for, and there is nothing outside this context to 
help us in that decision and that work, as far as I can see. This is a concrete example of 
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how the Foucauldian-Nietzschean tradition solves the problem of normative 
justification through contextualism: the justification lies in our consensus (including 
our consensus with other like-minded individuals and groups), and there is no 
objective 'better argument' outside this consensus that may be used to justify it. In sum, 
like Mark, I'm happy to subscribe to the principles of liberal democracy, but unlike 
Mark I don't need these principles to be justified by being 'universal within' or other 
rhetorical smoke and mirrors. Indeed, I take universal justification to be impossible and 
observe that Mark has not supported his call for such justification with a demonstration 
that it is possible, or even plausible. However, now that I've seen Mark give up on 
Universals with a capital U, I trust he will soon also give up on universals with a small 
u, the latter being a much smaller step than the former, in my analysis. 
I would add here that only a superficial reading of Foucault could come away 
with Mark's conclusion that 'Foucault expects his readers to supply the normative 
evaluation' of his work. Foucault's work is self-admittedly normative through and 
through in its choice of problematic, evidence, teasing out of implications for the 
present, etc. It is true that Foucault, like any good writer, leaves space for readers to do 
their own normative evaluations and encourages them to do so. But to equate this with 
readers doing the full normative work is misleading and gets the point of Foucault's 
interventions and methodology wrong, in my view.  
 Mark challenges me to give him 'an example of transparency, however 
contextualist, that does not presuppose implicitly within it that "participants must 
openly explain their goals and intention"' (Mark's emphasis), as if that would be a 
difficult thing to do. But it's easy: the conduct of court cases in liberal democracies is 
such an example. Court cases are aimed at establishing transparency, typically about a 
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conflict or a crime, so the judge (with or without a jury) can make an informed ruling 
on the case. It is not required, however, that all participants openly explain their goals 
and intentions. There is even a legal privilege that the defendant can keep silent, that is, 
the main participant has the explicit and undisputed right to be the exact opposite of 
open and to not explain anything at all, directly falsifying Mark's thesis. The 
prosecution and defense also do not have to explain their goals and intentions openly 
or in a balanced way. The conduct of court cases allows for all sorts of strategic and 
tactical behaviors not permitted in Mark's and Habermas' ideal world of the force of 
the better argument. I encourage Mark and other Habermasians to think about why that 
is, perhaps after attending a few court cases and comparing what happens there with 
Habermasian discourse ethics. For me, the reason is that the people who invented and 
developed our court systems understood the relationship between power and truth and 
how to deal with it practically. We are lucky, it seems to me, that our courts were not 
designed by idealistic theoreticians like Mark and Habermas, but by pragmatic realists.  
 Mark's idealism leads him to conclude, 'It seems to be obvious that to the extent 
to which actors disguise their goals and intentions the process is not transparent and is 
normatively reprehensible, whatever the context!' That's a very global statement – 
Universal with a capital U ('whatever the context') and as such it immediately gets 
Mark into trouble, because it is not obvious at all it would apply under any and all 
circumstances. By this standard most court cases in liberal democracies would be 
normatively reprehensible, and perhaps Mark thinks they are. I respectfully disagree 
and have argued elsewhere that solving conflicts, including court cases, by means of 
Habermas' five discourse-ethical principles would lead to deadlock and breakdown of 
the court system  (Flyvbjerg 2001: 106). As observed by Bernstein (1992: 221), any 
society must have some procedures for dealing with conflicts that cannot be resolved 
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by argumentation, even when all parties are committed to rational argumentation.  
Courts in liberal democracies secure this type of conflict resolution, among other 
things. Mark's thinking here seems not only utopian but also sociologically naive. 
 Mark finds 'totally suspect', Machiavelli's observation that humans are 
'ungrateful, fickle, liars, and deceivers'. This may be because Mark misses the point 
Machiavelli is making. Mark thinks Machiavelli is out to make an 'essentialist claim', 
in Mark's words, which indeed would be suspect, but which would also go completely 
against character for Machiavelli, whose whole way of thinking and acting emphasized 
pragmatism and actionable verita effettuale. With the above observation, Machiavelli 
(1983: 111-12) simply wants us to remember that '[a]ll writers on politics have pointed 
out ... that in constituting and legislating for a commonwealth it must be taken for 
granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity 
that is in their minds when opportunity offers.' This is worst-case thinking aimed at 
protecting a state and its citizens against human evil, not a global statement about 
human character. Machiavelli's point is that we will land in serious trouble if we 
organize society based on idealist ideas, like Habermasian discourse ethics, that 
assume away evil and thus contain no checks and balances – other than an abstract 
appeal to reason – to control evil. History teaches us that utopian thinking that assumes 
evil away typically gives free rein to evil. This is why Nietzsche (1968: 192-93) 
emphatically says 'perhaps there has never before been a more dangerous ideology ... 
than this will to good.' From this point of view the ideas of Mark and Habermas are 
part of the problem, not the solution. And the lesson to be learned from Machiavelli 
and Nietzsche is not so much that moralism is hypocrisy, but that the first step to 
becoming moral is realizing we are not. The next step is establishing checks and 
balances that adequately reflect this. The primary task is to reduce the scope for evil, 
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not to increase the opportunity for utopia, be it discourse ethics or any other ideal 
construct. Mark asks, 'why should we care what Machiavelli (or Nietzsche) says?' This 
is why. And of course Mark would be the last to see this, because he himself, or rather 
his idealism, is the target of Machiavelli's and Nietzsche's critique. They understand 
that idealist theoreticians like Mark and Habermas are ultimately dangerous, to the 
extent their ideas about power and truth were to serve as basis for designing real 
institutions in real societies. And Machiavelli and Nietzsche are keen to alert us to this 
danger and to explain how we may protect ourselves against it. 
Mark makes a big deal of my winning the argument with the Aalborg alderman 
by means of a solid packet of data (Flyvbjerg 2001: 156-61). I agree with Mark this is 
truth prevailing over domination, and today I use different packs of data to similarly 
influence power relations for megaprojects (Flyvbjerg 2013). But Mark seems to think 
this undermines my understanding of the relationship between truth and power while 
supporting that of Habermas. This is wrong. My understanding of truth and power is 
exactly about understanding situations where truth may gain the upper hand as a 
'weapon of the weak', and then acting on those situations, cf., my concept of 'tension 
points' (Flyvbjerg 2012). However, there are many more situations where truth loses 
out to power than the opposite, which means Mark is also wrong when he says that 
Stewart's proposition that 'it is power relations that determine what becomes 
legitimated as truth' is falsified by my work. On balance, my work, and that of other 
phenomenologists of power, proves Stewart to be exactly right on this point, which 
does not rule out individual instances of truth dominating power, needless to say, as in 
the case of the alderman. Moreover, I maintain that Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and 
Foucault are superior to Habermas for understanding the truth-power complex, 
including grasping where and how truth may dominate power. But that's all I'm saying. 
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I'm not trying to refute or dodge anything, as Mark says I am ('That is not a proper 
refutation'); I'm just pointing to what I consider the most valuable texts for anyone who 
wants to understand the relationship between power and truth. 
 Mark says, he 'does not know what it means to say that phronesis meets "the 
conventional standards of validity for social science research".' That's interesting and 
slightly disturbing. But here's a suggestion: Simply send a piece of research, phronetic 
or not, to a peer-reviewed social science journal that you respect, and your peers will 
tell you what the conventional scholarly standards are for those parts of your research 
that in their view don't meet these standards. That's concretely how scholars learn the 
conventional standards of their field, as shown by Thomas Kuhn, Bruno Latour, and 
other sociologists of science; not by reading Habermas or Popper in the abstract. 
However, for arguments sake I'm happy to accommodate Mark by accepting Popperian 
falsification and Habermasian force-of-the-better-argument as two of many possible 
criteria for establishing validity. That does not mean, however, I have to 'give up the 
view that truth is inextricably tied to power', as Mark says I must. Truth about social 
phenomena – maybe about natural ones, too, but let's leave that aside for the moment – 
will always have power effects, for instance by strengthening one social position and 
weakening another, and in this sense truth is always tied to power, no matter how the 
validity of that truth was established, as long as it was accepted as valid truth. 
Finally, a minor point of clarification. Stewart says that above I propose 'the 
equivalence of "power" and "truth".' I hope not. I see power and truth as interrelated in 
a way where power influences truth and truth influences power. But that is not 
equivalence, because based on existing evidence I see the dominant relationship 
running from power to truth, that is, power holds more sway over truth than vice versa. 
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To conclude, I agree with Stewart that today a difficulty in philosophy and social 
science is maintaining an effective dialogue between theoretical and practical 
consciousness. This dialogue must be open and alive if we want philosophy and social 
science to matter to society, and unfortunately it is not. However, the lack of effective 
dialogue is a self-made problem created by philosophers and social scientists following 
the rationalist tradition of Plato, Kant, and Habermas to its current dead end. The 
antidote is right there under our noses, complete with theoretical justification, 
methodological guidelines, and elaborate examples of application. It is the pragmatic 
tradition of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Nietzsche, begun more than two thousand years 
ago with Aristotle's critique of his teacher, Plato, for being too abstract and theoretical 
to be useful in practical life, and later refined in Machiavellian verita effettuale, 
Nietzschean wirkliche Historie, and Foucauldian genealogy with the explicit purpose 
of looking for truth that may effectively change power and practice. If you want to 
isolate yourself in theory and academia, the intellectual tradition of Plato, Kant, and 
Habermas will serve you well. If you want your work to make a difference in practice, 
I suggest the tradition of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Nietzsche is the better choice. 
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i This email exchange took place in 2013. 
ii I remember that when reading these words I set the book down and wondered if I should give up 
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